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The arena of entrepreneurial behavior of MNCs from new emerging markets and how they develop opportunities in other new 
emerging markets is almost untouched. This paper tries to answer how firms from new emerging markets manage their 
entrepreneurships in other new emerging markets. Unlike the internationalization of Western firms, firms from new emerging 
markets often lack sufficient knowledge and therefore internationalize quickly by acquisitions. This entrepreneurial behavior is 
contaminated with high risk. How these firms manage the process of opportunity discovery and exploitation becomes an 
interesting topic for research. The study aims to develop a theoretical frame for analysis of the firms’ entrepreneurial behavior 
when developing new opportunity. It employs business network view for deeper understanding of opportunity development in the 
process before and after an acquisition. The process view in this construction grasps the two internationalization elements of 
knowledge and resource commitment. Network approach is used to analyze the empirical case study of a Turkish firm’s 
international opportunity discovery in Romania during the period of 1998-2014. The study aims to promote new knowledge on 
how firms from new emerging markets manage such opportunity when acquiring a firm from another new emerging market.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Istanbul Univeristy. 
Keywords: Opportunity Development; Turkey; Kastamonu Entegre; Romania; Commitment;  Knowledge 
 
 
* Dr.Gözde YILMAZ.  
E-mail address: gozde.yilmaz@fek.uu.se  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Istanbul Univeristy.
983 Gözde Yilmaz et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  982 – 992 
1. Introduction 
    The global business landscape is changing rapidly with the increasing presence of multinational firms from 
emerging economies. With this development, studies on the internationalization behavior of emerging economy 
MNCs’ (EMNC) have proliferated. However, most of these studies either focused on the EMNCs from the BRIC 
countries (Carvalho, Costa & Duysters, 2010; Kalotay, 2008; Pradhhan & Sauvant, 2010) or investigated the 
EMNC´s internationalization in developed countries (Milelli, Hay & Shi, 2010; Zhang, Duysters & Filippov, 2012). 
The question of how EMNCs behave in other emerging markets, however has remained almost untouched, despite 
the fact that emerging markets present more opportunities for EMNCs to internationalize. Unlike the 
internationalization of MNCs from West which resides on their knowledge and experience on foreign markets, 
EMNCs often lack sufficient business and socio-political knowledge. This fact becomes more salient with the 
EMNCs’ quick and risky entrepreneurial behavior in emerging markets for capitalizing on opportunities. Intersection 
of the internationalization with entrepreneurship studies inspired by concepts of risk and opportunity development in 
cross-border business activities provides a suitable venue for investigating the EMNCs behaviors in other emerging 
markets. In addition, international opportunity development which most of the empirical studies on entrepreneurship 
lacks (McMullen & Dimov, 2013; Tegtmeier & Mitra, 2013) can aid further knowledge. Within the context of 
business networks, the aim of this study is to investigate the opportunity development process of a Turkish giant 
wood-based panel producer, Kastamonu Entegre, in Romania between 1998-2014 by focusing on the knowledge and 
commitment aspects captured from the study of Johanson & Vahlne (1977, 2003, 2009). The case study also has the 
potential to address the need to look beyond the international entrepreneurship of new ventures or born global in 
high technology industries. The empirical study in this paper is Kastamonu Entegre, which represents a latecomer 
EMNC from a traditional mature manufacturing industry. Despite the increasing number and importance of Turkish 
MNCs, little is known about their internationalization processes and their entrepreneurial activities for international 
opportunity development. Most of the studies on Turkish MNCs focused on the determinants of Turkish OFDI 
(Kaya & Erden, 2008; Demirbag & Tatoglu ; 2008, Kok & Ersoy, 2009) or entry modes (Demirbag & Tatoglu, 
2008), whereas few studies investigated the internationalization of Turkish MNCs from a process view and go 
beyond the initial market entry stage to analyze the exploitation of opportunities (Goldstein, Bonaglia & Mathews, 
2006; Eren-Erdogmus et al., 2010).  
The effort in this study is to answer the following questions: How did a late internationalized Turkish MNC from 
a mature manufacturing industry behave in another emerging market during the opportunity development process? 
How were the commitments and knowledge prior and/or during the opportunity development process developed in 
the relationship as well in the firms business network? For the purpose of the study, the opportunity development 
process of Kastamonu Entegre in Romania was divided into three stages of pre-acquisition, during acquisition and 
post-acquisition. The study is structured as follows; The first part of the study presents the theoretical framework. 
The second part of the study conveys the methodology and in the third part findings are discussed. The last part of 
the study is devoted to present conclusions. 
2. Theoretical Framework  
    With the acceleration of globalization, the subject of the internationalization process of the firm has attracted 
more attention. The Uppsala Internationalization Model (IP) is one of the leading and widely accepted model on the 
subject of the internationalization process. According to the IP-model, firm’s internationalization is a gradual and 
incremental process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Knowledge and commitment constitute the main elements of the 
model and the interplay between them shapes the internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Commitment is 
defined as the resources allocated to a foreign market and guide the firm’s action. Commitment increases gradually 
with knowledge accumulation. Therefore, firms start with commitments to similar markets as this reduces the 
uncertainty and risk in internationalization sourcing from the lack of knowledge. 
Three types of knowledge were identified for successful internationalization: general internationalization-, 
market- and institutional knowledge (Hadjikhani & Ghuari; 2001). Market knowledge includes experiential 
knowledge of clients, market and competitors while institutional knowledge includes experiential knowledge 
regarding the government, institutional frameworks, rules, norms and values. While the general internationalization 
knowledge can be applied across markets, market and institutional knowledge are market-specific and experiential 
in nature. As the uncertainty reducing effect of general internationalization knowledge was not supported in the 
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market entry process, market specific knowledge gains more importance (Hilmersson & Jansson, 2012). This is 
especially true for emerging markets that are unstable and lack uniform occurrence (Hadjikhani et al., 2008; 
Sandberg, 2013). Lack of earlier experience in new markets may enforce the firm to gain the necessary knowledge 
from counterparts in the network. With the integration of a network view to IP model, the concept of commitment 
was expanded to include relationship commitment and also relationships with those including suppliers, customers, 
competitors and legal authorities. For acquisition of a firm wherein the parties do not have cooperation experience 
additional commitments are required to compensate for the lack of knowledge. Thus, when acquiring a firm from a 
foreign market where the acquiring firm has no specific knowledge, the process in commitment decisions face 
hitches affecting the opportunity development, especially in the initial phase of market entry as their 
internationalization is strongly tied to their position in this network.  
Contrary to those implying direct connection between commitment and knowledge, a commitment such as an 
acquisition of a firm from a new emerging market by another firm from another new emerging market can disturb 
that connection, meaning that foreign market commitment is not always tied to knowledge. Sometimes despite their 
lack of knowledge, firms are eager to go abroad and use high commitment as a mean to learn and accumulate 
specific knowledge. Therefore, depicting internationalization as a process shaped by risk avoidance and gradual 
increase of commitment is far from covering the essence of internationalization. Internationalization is also a 
process shaped by the firm’s entrepreneurship and search for business opportunities. This is especially true for the 
EMNCs because their rapid internationalization follow different paths than the ones predicted by the original IP-
model. It is for such shortcomings that the IP model is been criticized by a number of researchers.  
The revised IP-model was developed to capturing the new business reality. It reconceptualizes 
internationalization as an opportunity development process and stresses the importance of entrepreneurial activities 
in the internationalization process (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006; 2009). This shift from smooth uncertainty reduction 
to opportunity development brings internationalization studies closer to entrepreneurship studies as opportunity 
becomes the key element of both literatures (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990, 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, 
Krueger, 2003). In this context, opportunity development is defined as the process of developing market need or 
resource recognition into a viable business and consists of opportunity recognition, evaluation, and development 
phases (Ardichvilia, Cardozo & Ray, 2003). Considering commitment and knowledge development, 
internationalization is defined as “the recognition and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity that leads to new 
international market entry” (Chandra, Styles & Wilkinson, 2008; 31). Although risk avoidance has been replaced by 
opportunity, knowledge keeps its central place in the internationalization process model. As stated by Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977; 1990): “Knowledge of opportunities and problems” is the initiator of internationalization. 
Internationalizing firms rely on their knowledge in order to recognize and exploit opportunities in new markets since 
knowledge decreases the uncertainty associated with entering new markets. Knowledge regarding the opportunities 
initiates the internationalization process. Recognition of opportunity requires resource and/or relation commitment 
to develop the opportunity further into a viable overseas business. Commitment increases the accumulated 
knowledge of the firm which eases the recognition of new opportunities. Thus, opportunity development becomes 
connected to knowledge and commitment. 
It has been found that networks of relations are important for the pursuit of international opportunities because 
knowledge created through networks are a rich source of available or co-created opportunities and offer important 
clues about new markets to enter (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Falize & Couerderoy, 2012). Creating a network of 
relations through acquisition involving parties with no earlier experience of each other is, however, time consuming. 
On the other hand, acting fast to capitalize on the market opportunity is important, and EMNCs lacking international 
experience need to shorten the time it takes to gaining market knowledge. Therefore, EMNCs tend to behave 
differently and take bold steps when opportunities appear. 
EMNCs often prefer high commitment and high risk entry modes like acquisitions as a mean to gain experiential 
knowledge to accelerate their internationalization (Meyer, 2013; Meyer & Thajongrak, 2013). Besides compensating 
the knowledge gap of EMNCS, acquisitions are learning opportunities which facilitate the perception and 
development of business opportunities (Meyer & Thajongrak, 2013). Therefore, acquisitions made by EMNCs 
functions as a mechanism for competitive catch-up through opportunity seeking and capability transformation 
(Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). If EMNCs are successful in learning from their acquisition, the knowledge they 
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obtained will facilitate the opportunity development process in foreign markets. If lack of experiential knowledge 
regarding the new market is not an obstacle the EMNCs do not always increase commitment gradually. According 
to Cuervo-Cazurro’s study (2011), knowledge developed in the home market sourcing from running multiple 
operations can help the firms to overcome such difficulties. Running multiple operations in home market resulted in 
the development of complexity management capability which is especially helpful in firm’s first foreign expansion 
into different countries than its home. Since most of the Turkish MNCs belong to a group of companies which have 
businesses in various sectors, lack of prior international experience and knowledge in a foreign market doesn’t affect 
their internationalization negatively. They are ready to take the risk and develop the capability of managing 
complexity at home before going abroad. 
Importance of prior knowledge together with the firm´s resources is also noted in opportunity recognition since it 
emerges through insights into new value of certain resources or new resource combinations (Sanz-Velasco, 2006; 
251; Shane, 2000). Firm resources such as technology and personnel are important in the pursuit of international 
opportunities (Sanz-Velasco, 2006;256). Thus, internationalizing of EMNC doesn’t have to take the long road to 
acquire this market-specific knowledge when the firms are willing to take, or underestimate, the risks. Operating in 
protected home markets for a long time also means having vast firm resources for the EMNCs which sometimes 
cause them to skip some stages of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Size and age of the firm is 
important in the internationalization of the firms, since these mean they have more capabilities needed for initiating, 
developing and maintaining complex activities demanded by internationalization (Torres et al., 2013; 108-109). 
As mentioned by Cuervo-Cazurra (2011), if a firm is in business-to-business industry, it increases the 
applicability of business knowledge across different markets because “they are selling to other companies which are 
less effected by the differences in religious, cultural or economic variations across countries than are consumers’ 
needs.” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Turkish MNCs in this sense have strong manufacturing capabilities and are good at 
process innovation (Yosun & Çetindamar, 2013) which neutralizes the thought on the superiority of DMNCs in 
production technology. 
3. Methodology 
    Case study was chosen as the appropriate method for revealing how the EMNCs internationalized in other 
emerging markets and how the relationship between opportunity development, knowledge and commitment affect 
the internationalization process and the influence of networks in opportunity development process. Case study also 
can put the contextual nature of opportunity development process (Pettigrew, 1985). It also helps us to understand 
the specific incidents through time and network of relations. Previous researches did not througly explain the 
international opportunity development process of EMNCs in another emerging country adopting a process view. 
We study the Turkish giant wood based panel producer Kastamonu Entegre’s internationalization process in 
Romania 1998-2014 and focus on the phases of internationalization by dividing them into three phases named pre-
acquisition, during and post-acquisition. Kastamonu Entegre is the only Turkish MNC in wood based panel sector 
which has investments abroad. As a late internationalized MNC, its internationalization in Romania was examined 
retrospectively.  
Empirical data for the study was collected by in-depth interviews in November 2014 and February 2015. More 
than ten interviews ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours were conducted, taped and transcribed. With the help of the 
available secondary data, triangulation was made. All the directors were knowledgeable on the internationalization 
process of the firm. All the decision-makers who are positioned as directors in Romania were interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted in Turkish and English and recorded with the consent of the interviewees.  Secondary 
data were used for supporting the primary data derived from the interviews. Corporate webpages, company 
periodicals, magazine and newspaper articles were used as a secondary data.  Trustworthiness of the study was 
increased with the triangulation of primary and secondary data (Yin, 1994). 
Background 
    Turkey emerged as a significant outward foreign direct investor (OFD) in the West-Asia Group (Vardar, 2014) 
with the increasing number of MNCs. Since the Turkish MNCs internationalization is later, compared to their 
competitors from developed economies, they don’t have the luxury of waiting (Goldstein, Bonaglia & Mathews, 
2006). For compensating their latecomer disadvantages, firms like Kastamonu Entegre are aware that they have to 
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capitalize on the opportunities faster if they are to compete with DMNCs. Thus, they are more inclined to invest in 
other new emerging markets (EM) with high level of risks and uncertainties but with promising opportunities to 
develop. In order to capitalize fast on these opportunities in emerging markets, Kastamonu Entegre exhibits more 
risky and aggressive behaviors like acquisition without having sufficient market knowledge because they know that 
the opportunities in emerging market cannot be found after a short time.  
Main push factors behind Turkish firms’ OFDI were documented as economic and political instability, high cost 
of raw material and energy, crowding home market and unfavorable legal climate together with the red tape (Yosun 
& Çetindamar, 2013). While these factors were pushing Turkish firms to invest abroad, emergence of new markets 
in Turkey’s periphery with promising opportunities after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain 
pulled more Turkish firms to international arena (Anıl et al., 2011). Kastamonu Entegre was one of the first firms to 
recognize the opportunities in these markets and capitalize on them. Kastamonu Entegre is a global player in wood-
based panel production with its 13 production plants in Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Tatarstan employing nearly 6000 people. It reached 1.4 billion USD revenue in 2014 and is the 10th biggest wood-
based panel producer in the world and 6th in Europe. Kastamonu Entegre is the first and still the only Turkish wood 
based panel producer which has production plants abroad. So this fact made the internationalization process of the 
firm more noteworthy to study. After its establishment under Hayat Holding in 1969, Kastamonu Entegre opened its 
first factory in 1971 and continued its steady growth within Turkey for nearly 30 years. Firm’s internationalization 
journey started with the acquisition of Romanian Prolemn S.A. in 1998.  
Pre-Acquisition  Phase  
    Turkey has always been a vibrant market with a high demand for wood based panel products. Production capacity 
of the wood based panel producers in Turkey fell short of the local demand in 1990s and most of 2000s. Seeing this 
gap, Kastamonu Entegre focused on producing particleboard and MDF mostly for the domestic market in those 
years. As a result, firm developed important capabilities in particleboard and MDF production. Due to the high price 
of limited domestic wood supply, red tape and the unpredictable increases in currencies sourcing from economic 
crisis, Kastamonu Entegre decided to go abroad. Main motive behind the internationalization of the firm was 
resource seeking, not market seeking. By doing so, the firm also aimed to diversify the local market risk. At that 
time, the firm had also developed advanced manufacturing capabilities on MDF. The firm owed its 
internationalization to the founder’s vision, alertness and international background and experience of the top 
management. Due to the low personnel turnover, mutual trust between the firm’s founder and the top management 
was established in those years. This trust also eased going abroad as it lowered the coordination and control cost for 
the founder.  
Acquisition Phase 
    Fall of the “Iron Curtain” and the liberalization of economic systems presented opportunities in resource rich 
Central and Eastern European countries. These opportunities attracted many entrepreneurs from Turkey to these 
countries. Kastamonu Entegre’s search for opportunities in these countries began in 1996 just after the privatization 
wave in the mid 1990’s and finalized with the purchase of bankrupt S.C. Prolemn S.A. Company from the 
Romanian Privatization Administration in 1998. The firm purchased %98 of the shares without receiving any 
privatization incentive or support from the state. Short after this in 2000, Kastamonu Entegre made another 
acquisition in Bulgaria. Reason for going to Romania and Bulgaria officially announced as cheap and high quality 
wood supply, not low labor costs. Acquisited Prolemn S.A. was mainly a timber processing firm which suffered 
from a long period of inefficiency with an outdated production technology. Due to the fact that the Reghin region is 
rich in resources, the firm was able to buy raw material in advantageous conditions. Kastamonu Entegre initially had 
to go into harvesting work although it was not the firm’s main business. The firm renewed the timber processing and 
established a plywood factory in 1999. By these initial investments, Kastamonu Entegre was able to benefit from 
600 employees of the acquired firm in a short time without doing a massive layoff. In a small city like Reghin, 
negative reactions could carry the risk of hampering Kastamonu Entegre’s operations. It would also negatively 
affect the further integration of the firm to Romania. 
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By harvesting, the firm learned to supply wood from the local market which was critical for continuity of 
production, cost and the future investment plans. During these initial stages, imprints of the Communist era was still 
in place as at that time there existed nearly no private firm to supply wood. So the firm learned to buy forest from 
the state agency Romsilva. Acquisition helped the firm to handle these things smoothly and also gave key Turkish 
managers time to learn because local employees knew how to deal with the local market.  As the effect of 
Communism left its place to market functioning gradually, suppliers’ structure changed and Kastamonu Entegre 
experienced them in the first hand. The firm learned suppliers, their geographical dispersion and logistics. Due to 
this knowledge, it was mentioned that the firm has never experienced a production stoppage sourcing from the lack 
of supply. One of the biggest concerns for production was solved. However, Kastamonu Entegre’s reason for 
purchasing Prolemn was not harvesting or plywood production. Firm’s initial plan was to build a MDF factory as it 
is among the firm’s main capability. But in those years, there was plenty of MDF in the market. Therefore, the firm 
searched and found a niche market with no competitor. It was doorskin production which held a great potential. 
Prolemn S.A. restructured radically and started to produce doorskins in 2002 with an investment of nearly 100 
million USD. Thus, this acquisition is considered as a brownfield investment (Meyer & Estrin, 2001).  
This plant became the first doorskin factory in the continental Europe and represented a strategic move against 
the monopoly of the American firms in a very profitable market niche. Although Kastamonu Entegre lacked prior 
production knowledge regarding doorskin, profit expectation of the firm outweighed the lack of production 
knowledge. The firm overcame this difficulty with its extensive knowledge on MDF production and with its over-
reliance on highly educated Turkish and Romanian engineers at the beginning stage of the production. As the firm 
didn’t have a previous know-how about doorskin production, it used much more outsourcing in the beginning to 
gain the know-how. One obstacle for learning was the absence of a similar factory in Europe which Kastamonu 
could use its production process as a benchmark. 
Besides the lack of competition, doorskin production was a cleverly designed investment from every aspect. 
MDF and particleboard are heavy in load but light (cheap) in their cost. They lose their competitive advantage if 
they are transported to distances more than 700 km. Unlike MDF and particleboard, doorskin is a product that can 
export to far distances. This reality made exporting possible to countries ranging from South America to India.  
Creating a market for the doorskin was also as difficult as gaining the production knowledge regarding to it. From 
the start of the doorskin investment, Kastamonu Entegre aimed exporting because Romania and the nearby markets 
are not big enough to amass the produced amount.  
Therefore, Kastamonu Entegre tried to create a market in Turkey because of its big population with a booming 
construction sector. Kastamonu Entegre established another factory in Ankara, Turkey to introduce the product to 
the market and door manufacturers. Only in 4 years, Kastamonu achieved to create a market for doorskin in Turkey 
which can amass the majority of production. In a very short time, Doorskin production became a profitable business 
for Kastamonu Entegre. Production capacity increased gradually from 2 million pieces in 2002 to 6 million pieces in 
2005.  
Due to the increased demand for doorskins, Kastamonu Entegre added a second production line in 2006 with a 30 
million USD investment which doubled the amount produced. Now, Kastamonu Romania has 10% doorskin market 
share in the world and 40% share in the European market. It ranks 2nd in the European doorskin production. Main 
export markets are Turkey, Russia and Iran. The rest is being exported to nearly 45 different countries. With the 
opening of the second doorskin line, needed amount of wood increased to 17.000 tons a month from the previous 
10.000 tons per month in the period of 2003-2004. The firm stopped harvesting and started to supply wood from 
individuals and small firms which made the relationship with the supplier more important. To provide this amount, 
firm started to contact with the suppliers in more distant areas. With the doorskin investment, Kastamonu Entegre 
shake the monopoly of the few doorskin producers as their power to set the price with high premium became 
limited. This reality made Kastamonu Entegre’s Romania investment attractive. For the following 6 years, other 
firms attempted to acquire the firm. 
As the targeted market for doorskin is not Romania or the nearby markets, Kastamonu Entegre experienced a 
relative delay in getting to know the Romania and the nearby market’s customers. For that reason until 2012, all of 
marketing efforts of Romanian subsidiary were directed by the sales team in the Istanbul headquarter. But this 
doesn’t mean that the Kastamonu Entegre is an unknown player in the Romania market. Although the company saw 
Romania before as a spot market, they were selling their products in Romania market. This was an effort which 
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lacked a marketing strategy at that time because these markets were seen as spot markets which came to minds when 
there was a surplus of production in Turkey.  
Post-Acquisition Phase 
    Since 2001, Kastamonu Entegre recorded an annual growth of %30 in USD in each year. This eased the firm to 
make further commitments to its foreign operations. Kastamonu Entegre publicly announced its intention to open a 
new particleboard factory in Romania in 2006-2007 because the firm was aware of the Romania and nearby 
markets’ potential for particleboard and MDF. By that time, Turkey market became relatively saturated with though 
domestic competition. Kastamonu Entegre knew that to be a global player, they need new markets to use the firm’s 
existing capabilities. However, fast changing laws of Romania contradicting with each other forced Kastamonu 
Romania to halt its commitment to Romania. Because, Romanian State Assets Resolution Authority (AVAS) 
claimed that Kastamonu Entegre did not comply the investment commitments of the privatization contract in due 
time and opened a lawsuit against the firm in July 2006 demanding a fine of 32 million USD. This came at a time 
when Kastamonu Entegre was thinking of a new investment in particleboard worth of 100 million USD. 
Kastamonu officials conveyed their frustration with this legal conflict to the Romanian vice PM. Amid the 
disagreements with the AVAS, firm started to think of opening a particleboard factory in Bulgaria instead of 
Romania as it was presenting more favorable conditions to international investors. During the years 2006-2012, the 
firm couldn’t do any further investment in Romania despite its willingness to do so.  
Although Kastamonu Entegre was one of the first movers to Romania in 1998 among its competitors, the feature 
of the doorskin investment together with the legal conflict with state authorities delayed its penetration to Romania 
and nearby markets. While Kastamonu Entegre was trying to deal with the uncertainties that this legal conflict 
brought, two Austrian competitors, Kronospan and Egger, used this period wisely to enter and dominate the 
Romania market. Kronospan entered Romania in June 2004 by purchasing a MDF unit and a particleboard plant 
from rival Gruppo Frati. Egger entered Romania in 2006 and started production in 2007.  
Early presence in markets with high potentials like Romania offers some competitive advantages because gaining 
market knowledge can take longer times. Until 2006, Kronospan has no real competitor in particleboard and 
dominated the market. During these years, some concerns were voiced by the furniture producers as Kronospan rose 
the price of the particleboard by %40 which is the main raw material used in furniture industry. Upon the complaints 
raised by the furniture producers, Romanian Competition Council fined Kronospan for abusing its dominant position 
and fined 870.000 Euros at the end of 2004. Although the market actors were ready for a new player as they want to 
have more choices to choose, Kastamonu came to the particleboard market in 2012 when the legal dispute was 
settled in favour of Kastamonu Entegre in 2011. In 2012 Kastamonu started to compete together with competitors its 
particleboard production. When Kastamonu started particleboard production in Romania, Romania was already an 
oversaturated market with the products of the two dominant Austrian rivals, Kronospan and Egger. Unlike doorskin 
investment, Kastamonu Entegre made its particleboard investment for expanding its market in Romania and nearby 
countries, not in the oversaturated market in Turkey.  
Particleboard investment in Romania is also a counter move of Kastamonu Entegre against one of its biggest 
competitor in Romania. Because this firm acquired a small firm in Turkey to get to know the market over that firm 
and took some market share from Kastamonu Entegre in Turkey. Kastamonu Entegre owning the %35 of Turkish 
market could not let such move, so made a counter move. This move was the particleboard investment in Romania. 
As a latecomer to the particleboard market, the company needed to take some market share from these giants with 
innovative ways (Luo & Tung, 2007). Market knowledge was very critical for the success of particleboard 
investment as Romania market is concentrated in the hands of a few big distributors. Kastamonu Entegre needed 
these distributors. Kastamonu acted very strategically and choose to transfer the sales manager and his team from 
the biggest rival, Kronospan. This strategy worked and in a very short time Kastamonu achieved to get a market 
share around %30.  
Structure of the distributors is very different to manage from Turkey. Kastamonu’s biggest distributor share in its 
sale doesn’t exceed %5 in Turkey. While the biggest distributor share in sale in Romania is around %50. So the trust 
based relations established previously became more important as the market is concentrated in the hands of few big 
players. This difficulty was overcome with the transferred marketing manager and his team. As a latecomer to the 
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Romania particleboard market, Kastamonu Entegre’s existence disturbed the Austrian competitors. The reason for 
the fear is sourcing from the expectation that Turkish rival would compete with them in terms of price and destroy 
the market. Contrary to what they expected, Kastamonu Romania positioned itself between the two giant rivals in 
terms of production quality and price. Until the start of particleboard production, there was no marketing department 
in Romania. All of these operations were managed from the headquarter for a very long time. With the saturation of 
Turkish market, Kastamonu Entegre’s conceptualization of the market changed considerably and now the firm aims 
a 950 million market including the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean basin.  
In 2014 Kastamonu Romania sold 1/3 of the particleboard production to Romania market and 2/3 to the nearby 
markets. The biggest market after Romania is Hungary, followed by Poland, Serbia, Moldavia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Check, and other Balkan countries. Kastamonu Romania is not an unknown player in markets like Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia as the firm sold its products in these markets before. But there are new 
markets for Kastamonu Entegre such as Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland and Italy. The firm was not dealing 
with these markets before because its production capacity was already sold out to other countries. But with the 
opening of the particleboard factory in Romania, these markets came to the scope of the firm. Nearby markets are 
not considered as though as the Romania market because the distributor structure is more fragmented which ease the 
entering to this market.  
With the increasing production capacity and saturation of Turkey, the need for the subsidiaries to be active in 
different markets became more apparent. Subsidiaries began to establish their marketing department and be more 
independent from the headquarter.  
Competition was also hard on the supply side as the area for the wood supply sometimes overlaps between the 
rivals. This increased the supplier negotiation power and makes them switch easily between the buyers. So this 
makes the supplier relations more critical.  These relations were managed by increasing the number of field 
personnel who are responsible from visiting the suppliers on a regular basis for face to face communication.   
Relations with the political actors posed difficulties for Kastamonu Entegre in Romania. Fast changing 
governments and bureaucrats made establishing a long-term relation impossible. On the other hand, the competitors 
use the advantage of coming from an EU country which has great decision power in EU. Their government view of 
the wood companies as strategic and backing them also shortened the decision process regarding these firms in 
Romania. Austrian rivals can do more lobbying. As a whole, Austrian and German firms’ dominant place in FDI to 
Romania, affected the use of preferences on behalf of these firms. So in this sense, Kastamonu Romania has a slight 
disadvantage. Although the state authorities didn’t treat the competitors differently, it is noticeable that the decision 
process for them is shorter relative to Kastamonu Entegre. All of the managers and directors agreed that they 
expected much support from the Romanian government, but the government acted neutral.  
Results 
Kastamonu Entegre is the only Turkish wood based panel producer that has investments abroad. After 20 years in 
the home market, Kastamonu Entegre recognized the opportunities in the nearby market, Romania, and acted rapidly 
to capitalize on the opportunity. The acquisition was made under the high risk and high uncertainty condition. High 
commitment of the firm in the absence of market knowledge delineated the different internationalization path of late 
internationalized EMNCs. This first step of the firm is a combination of many factors. As also stated by Autio, 
Sapienze & Almeida, (2000) the factors are the prior stock of knowledge, as well as its networks in the home and 
export markets. Initial plan of Kastamonu Entegre in purchasing the privatized Romanian firm was to produce MDF. 
MDF production was chosen as it could strengthen its capability. However, the saturated market at that time directed 
firm to doorskin investment. Doorskin investment was the best indicator of the firm’s industrial knowledge as this 
plant was the first doorskin factory in the continental Europe in a very profitable niche. Exploitation of this 
opportunity was related to Kastamonu Entegre’s taking advantage of the production network in Romania and its 
well-established sales network in Turkey. Kastamonu Entegre carefully benefitted its position in these two networks. 
Second investment in the doorskin was partially the result of learning how to operate in Romania and the growing 
demand in Turkey with high profit promises. As the commitment increased, new opportunities were discovered and 
developed through the established network connections with the wood suppliers, machine suppliers and employees.  
The opening of the particleboard factory was caused by the saturation of the home market and the result of 
finding new nearby markets with high potentials and also a counter-move to the rivals in Romania market. Deciding 
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on this third investment was come at a time when the problems with the Romanian Privatization Authorities were 
resolved and Romania became a member of EU which increases the predictability of the legal process.  
Networks are the main source of knowledge for the firm and expand within time with different and distinct 
dimensions. Kastamonu Entegre’s case richly presented this expansion and change in network relations. Kastamonu 
Entegre’s initial network in Romania was limited to suppliers, employees and regulators because the firm targeted 
the Turkish market mostly. Because of the dependence on the continuous wood supply, relations with the suppliers 
were crucial for the firm’s survival. In the first three years, firm learned the network of suppliers and gained a place 
in the network. This knowledge made the further commitments viable as the need for the raw material increased 
with further commitments of second line of doorskin production and new particleboard factory. Need to establish 
relations with buyers in Romania and nearby markets became important with the saturation of Turkish market and 
also with counter moves of competitors in Turkey aiming to lower the share of the firm in its home market. 
Although its existence in Romanian market since 1998, Kastamonu Entegre came in contact with the Romanian 
buyers in 2012 with its opening of particleboard production since it targeted Romania and nearby markets. 
Kastamonu tried to close the market knowledge gap and get a position in the buyer network by staffing a 
professional sale manager and his team, thereby shortened its entrance into a network that it was not a part of before. 
It also gained an important network position and trust in a short time despite the existence of two giant rival MNCs. 
Although not mentioned in the internationalization literature, it is called as learning through hiring by Song et al. 
(2003). As a big company owning %30 of the market share in Turkey, Kastamonu had financial resources to do such 
a transfer. By hiring the marketing manager, it also overcame the liability of outsidership which was sourcing from 
the lack of market-specific business knowledge and lack of relevant network positions (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). 
This brought trust of the market actors and learning too. Romania is an emerging economy with fast changing 
governments and legislations which make MNCs harder to predict the future and establish relations with these 
actors. Understanding the legal framework was very difficult for the Kastamonu Entegre in the initial stages of 
internationalization.  
4. Conclusion 
Adopting a network approach to the international opportunity development process of an EMNC, this case study 
showed the firm in its competitive context which was not covered in Uppsala Internationalization Model. By doing 
so, the case showed that how the firm kept control of its foreign operations in the absence of foreign market 
knowledge. Instead of gradual acquisition of market knowledge through its own experience, EMNCs can use 
different knowledge acquisition strategies to get this knowledge fast and to reduce the uncertainty of operating in a 
foreign market. On the other hand, emergent nature of one time opportunities forced the firm to decide on market 
entry in a very short time despite the lack of market knowledge. Kastamonu Entegre’s acquisition resulted in 
successful learning and the knowledge gained eased the further commitments of the firm which strengths its position 
in Romania and nearby markets. This study also represented a case which lies at the intersection of 
internationalization and entrepreneurial literature centering on opportunity development process. Internationalization 
of the Kastamonu Entegre firm didn’t fit the gradual stepwise approach to internationalization exactly. Entry into 
Romania with a high commitment and high risk mode earlier than its rivals exhibited a different internationalization 
path of an EMNC despite the fact that the firm had no previous international experience in operating abroad. 
Kastamonu Entegre’s this first international investment abroad carries the essence of entrepreneurship as it is an 
early entry into a new market reflecting the risk seeking propensity, proactiveness and also the innovativeness of 
Kastamonu Entegre’s entrepreneurial orientation (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001).  
Emprical data showed that EMNCs might be affected from their age, size, capabilities and prior knowledge in 
their internationalization. During the years in the domestic market, Kastamonu Entegre developed important 
production capabilities, technical and industrial specific knowledge. Prior general business knowledge of the firm 
helped it to recognize opportunities in nearby markets like Romania and Bulgaria, putting these different types of 
knowledge into use in different combination. After all, entrepreneurship is about the usage of even general 
knowledge for the pursuit of business opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). As also stated by McDougall, Shane & Oviatt, 
(1994) Kastamonu Entegre’s doorskin investment signifies that the firm combine its general knowledge under a 
successful mixture by merging its capabilities, experience. After the market entry, importance of market and 
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institutional knowledge became clearer for Kastamonu Entegre. Resource seeking motive was the main reason in the 
initial stages of internationalization. But within the time process, as the home country market became more 
saturated, market seeking motive became more apparent. This development needed a network position that the firm 
was not a part before. Position in the network was achieved with staffing an experienced network member from the 
rival MNC. 
As mentioned by Meyer (2014), especially late internationalized EMNCs can show us how organizations learn 
and how they accumulate international business knowledge other than the experiential learning. The case of KE 
shows that mature EMNCs can afford to accelerate their internationalization by externally recruiting key individuals 
and building a top management team with prior international experience (e.g. Meyer & Xia, 2012 cited in Meyer, 
2014). As the firm gained experience and accumulated local knowledge, resource commitment increased in 
accordance.  
Contradicting the IP model, the process in this case shows that the firm’s orientation to a market could change in 
line with the situation in home market and with the competitors’ position. When the home market was changing, the 
degree of commitment also changed. Kastamonu Entegre was initially more production oriented as the target 
markets were ready to amass the production. But as these markets became more saturated, the firm became more 
marketing oriented, i.e., it could increase or decrease its commitment based on the change in the market conditions 
in different countries. In the later foreign investments, these international marketing capabilities were used from the 
beginning. Although the market entry stage was not in line with Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) views which propose 
that commitment increase with knowledge acquisition and experience. However, the later commitments of 
Kastamonu Entegre to Romania verified the Johanson and Vahlne (1977) views.  
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